

**United States Military Doctrine
and the Conduct of
Counter-insurgency Operations:**

Fixing the Disconnect

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Abstract: Joint U.S. doctrine assigns Special Operations Forces (SOF) the primary mission of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) while under-emphasizing the importance of conventional forces. Historical analysis of the British in Malaya (1947-60) and French in Algeria (1954-62) highlight the necessity for conventional forces to be employed early and in overwhelming strength. Understanding the insurgent's stages of development, its causes and center of gravity are critical. The counter-insurgent must simultaneously apply the full spectrum of means available to ensure victory. This paper proposes to: 1) amend the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) and Joint Publication 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for FID and 2) refine counter-insurgency warfare doctrine and publish a new Joint Publication that describes it.

INTRODUCTION AND THESIS

Counter-insurgency operations have been and will remain part of the United States' foreign policy. In the past fifty years counter-insurgencies have been fought on every continent. As the world's sole "super power" with a National Military Strategy of "Shape, Respond and Prepare Now", direct involvement in counter-insurgency operations is very likely. Unfortunately, while there is ample proof that such operations will be part of the future, there is a lack of doctrine to guide successful preparation, planning and execution. To support the national strategy, doctrine is needed that will prepare the United States for success.

The United States lacks a complete and coherent military doctrine for conducting counter-insurgency operations. As a result, leaders, planners and individual servicemen are not training for the full spectrum of tasks necessary to be successful. This is the case jointly and among our service branches. This paper will showcase historical examples and scholarly studies to identify what essentials should be addressed, and provide lessons learned upon which future counter-insurgency doctrine can be formed. Specific proposals will be made to reshape doctrine and the pitfalls of failing to correct deficiencies will be explained.

PRESENT U.S. DOCTRINE

Doctrine necessarily begins with precise language. The Joint Doctrinal definitions are essential to any discussion on this topic because there is confusion and overlap among historical scholars and the military. The most common mistake is the interchangeable use of the terms insurgent and guerrilla.

The aspects of social, political and judicial struggle are closer to the foundation of an insurgency whereas the guerrilla is a means to an end. Insurgency warfare involves more than fighting; guerrilla or conventional fighting. A guerrilla is an unconventional warfare combatant who is also an insurgent, but not all insurgents are guerrillas. Understanding these differences is important because we cannot be satisfied with the attention given to counter-guerrilla or unconventional warfare alone. Counter-guerrilla warfare is a type of unconventional warfare and both can be aspects of counter-insurgency operations. It can be seen in history that conducting a successful counter-insurgency requires a full range of operations. In fact, excessive concentration on counter-guerrilla operations, or the disconnection between military operations in general and other aspects of counter-insurgency warfare are formulas for failure.

This first doctrinal gap between definitions highlights a serious gap between our tactics and strategy. The tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) used in counter-guerrilla operations are well addressed in our service manuals. Offense, defense, fire support and combat service support tactics all have some application in counter-insurgency operations. At the strategic level, the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) addresses Unconventional Warfare (U.W.) and Foreign Internal Defense (FID). At the operational level, Unconventional Warfare is again listed. The point is that counter-insurgency operations can be part of FID, and unconventional warfare is an aspect of counter-insurgency operations but neither fully define the tasks necessarily addressed at the operational level.

Tasks at the Theater Strategic and National Strategic level are very broad, and an argument could be made that all warfare assets as well as political, social, judicial and non-governmental organization coordination are included in them. FID doctrine does include

counter-insurgency operations but assigns Special Operations Forces (SOF) the primary mission for its execution. Joint Publication 3-07.1 “Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense”, addresses counter-insurgency operations from three angles; no use of military forces, military forces in supporting/non-combat role, and the use of the military in combat. Joint Doctrine makes some valuable points that are historically supported, but argues the case so far to the side of non-involvement of U.S. combat forces that, along with the absence of doctrine to the contrary, leaves the operational commander unprepared.

The next section of this paper addresses the stages of both insurgency and counter-insurgency. Clearly, SOF are critical in every stage of a counter-insurgency, mostly so early-on to help prevent the insurgency from growing. SOF are assigned eight primary missions including FID. The same Joint Publication (JP) that classifies this mission points out that SOF should not expand their role to combat operations as the insurgency intensifies noting, “SOF should not be used for operations whenever conventional forces can accomplish the mission.” In fact, of the eight operations U.S. forces may conduct in support of a host nation involved in a counter-insurgency all can be conducted by conventional light infantry whereas they cannot all be conducted simultaneously by SOF.

This is not an argument for reassigning missions or against the capabilities of SOF. Rather, it is an argument for recognition that counter-insurgency operations can require the application of the full spectrum of U.S. military capability and that failure to directly state this in operational doctrine has left tactical and operational commanders and their staff disconnected from each other and without a guide to coordinate available assets to achieve national policy objectives.

If doctrine guides planning coordination for possible operations in support of national policies, then the Mission Essential Task List (METL) should guide the operational commander in identification and refinement of those specific missions he must be prepared to conduct. FID in general and counter-insurgency operations in particular are not listed on any of the MEF METLs and only counter-insurgency operations is listed by the 18th Airborne Corps. There are many subordinate tasks applicable to FID and counter-insurgency operations but such a piecemeal approach while it may yield tactical military success, will promote operational and strategic failure. Joint doctrine is too vague and the service tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) in existence are insufficient when not doctrinally connected for the operational commander.

The neglect of counter-insurgency operations in general and the overemphasis on SOF as the larger, over arching mission coordinator of counter-insurgency operations (as part of FID) not only leaves conventional forces unprepared, it also leaves SOF unprepared to integrate their efforts with the likely Joint Force Commander (JFC). As an insurgency progresses from its formative stage to more mobile, active, guerrilla stages SOF efforts are likely to be reinforced with a Joint Force Commander with conventional light infantry. Historically, this is a logical next step and essential to success. However, if there is a lack of coordination among these forces or if the JFC understands the aspects of guerrilla warfare without an appreciation for the broader challenge of counter-insurgency operations, mission success will be in doubt. Our lack of doctrine guiding the operational commander to an understanding of counter-insurgency operations and the simultaneous assignment of FID to SOF

does nothing to bring the two communities (SOF and conventional forces) together doctrinally, in tactics, techniques and procedures, and certainly not in training.

Training is the final step in preparedness. If history hints of what the future may bring and doctrine tries to focus assets towards specific capabilities development, training is what must be done to ultimately prepare for pending operations. Counter-insurgency operations and FID are scarcely mentioned in service professional military education (PME). Although the attention given to Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) has increased the services have not bridged the gap between all these operations while adding the essential social, political and judicial aspects so essential in counter-insurgency operations.

Our review of doctrine reveals a need for corrective action. Clearly, we have a capable military that can be molded to achieve success in whatever it is trained to do, but it must identify what those needs are. To do this, history shows some of the essentials to successful counter-insurgency operations. Two historically significant counter-insurgency operations provide the lessons learned and stimulate recommendations for how to improve doctrine.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

The value in analysis of past counter-insurgency operations is in the lessons learned about the nature of such operations in general, and their critical strengths and vulnerabilities in particular. While no two insurgencies are identical, neither are two counter-insurgencies identical. However, similarities exist to guide doctrine, strategy, operations and tactics. The British counter-insurgency effort in Malaya, and then the French effort in Algeria will help provide a focus on the tenets of insurgency and counter-insurgency warfare. While the former is touted as a successful operation and the later is not, each shows instances of both positive and

negative actions that can collectively be addressed as tenants of future counter-insurgency doctrine.

MALAYA (1947-1960)

The insurgency in Malaya was fought from 1948 to 1960. It ended shortly after the granting of independence to Malaya in 1957. The Malayan insurgency was a Communist inspired conflict fueled by an ethnic Chinese minority population within Malaya calling for the ousting of British rule and European, Capitalist exploitation. The Malayan Communist Party began before World War II and during the war it fought against the Japanese. Although officially disbanded after the war it grew to become the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) in an attempt to hide its Chinese domination and make itself sound like it represented all the people of Malaya. Post Japanese occupied Malaya was ripe for insurgency; there was little infrastructure (police-military-judicial) and the country was geographically segmented by the central mountains and thick jungle.

Because the insurgents began their post-war insurgency with a core of party loyalists, they transitioned to guerrilla operations quickly. Terrorist acts, attacks on weak and scattered police outposts, intimidation, extortion, and propaganda came quickly and frequently. First to respond were the police and judicial branches of British government. An emergency was proclaimed, some civil rights were restricted and guerrillas were actively pursued. While police forces were expanded and the limited military initially available was used both to pursue guerrillas and protect civilians, insurgent activities also grew.

Success for Britain was very much in question until a very significant decision was made; the Briggs plan was put into effect. (So named because of the British General Sir Harold Briggs

who was the Director of Operations.) The plan called for dominating the populated areas, destroying the communist organizations, isolating and then eliminating the “bandits”. Before this could be done however, the British needed to greatly increase their military, police and Home Guard force. Eventually, against 6,000 to 8,000 insurgents the British mustered 40,000 police, 40,000 British soldiers and 250,000 members of the Home Guard. This force ratio of 55:1 was key to success. Having such an overwhelming force meant the British could be strong in many places at once. They could protect the people from the insurgents, isolate them from outside support and hunt them in their own backyard.

The British military employed were conventional light infantry. Although their counter-guerrilla skills were sharpened during the counter-insurgency, they remained a conventional force. The military objective of isolating and then destroying the insurgents was done through relentless patrolling. “One battalion calculated that they had worn out 15,000 pairs of jungle boots in three years in Malaya-- an average of 20 pairs per man.” This high level of British activity yielded results and earned them the respect and gratitude of the people. The British treated the Malayan people with respect, careful not to drive anyone into the insurgent’s camp. This was reflective of the British emphasis on civil-military coordination and cooperation. This cooperation,

“...demonstrated that it is a decisive factor not only in defeating the insurgents, but also in establishing a political solution. The machinery did, however, have to be built up after the emergency had been declared, and twelve years’ struggle might have been shorter, or indeed never have got going at all if the cooperation that was finally attained had existed in 1948.”

British success in Malaya was plagued by some serious initial weaknesses. The greatest error was in not investing enough manpower early in the emergency. Secondly, although ultimately a key to their success, the British were slow in recognizing the Malayan people and their desire for independence as the strategic center of gravity and take action to protect them and improve their condition. Finally, they recognized the “cause” espoused by the insurgents had merit and in 1952 promised independence; granted in 1957.

ALGERIA (1954-1962)

The French war against the National Liberation Front (FLN) insurgents lasted from 1954-1962. It ended in success for the insurgents against a superior French military and far more sophisticated French and French-Algerian infrastructure.

Just as the British expanded the size of police, military and Home Guard units, the size of the French military in Algeria grew from 50,000 to 500,000. While this ten-fold increase seems overwhelming, it corresponded with an expansion of the National Liberation Army (ALN) from 3,000 to 100,000. As such, the French relative combat power actually dwindled from 50:3 to 5:1. But these statistics can be misleading. Much of the ALN’s growth (later in the insurgency) was in conventional forces which the French managed to isolate from Algeria by securing the borders. The French however, tended to concentrate their forces much more than the British had in Malaya, in some case virtually relinquishing area dominance to the insurgents.

When the British expanded their military commitment they recognized a need for special training for their conventional forces. The French “...draftee was accustomed to a higher standard of living and better army supplies and installations than the guerrillas, and thus adapted less rapidly to the area.” “The bulk of the Army consisted of unwilling conscripts and discontent

recalled reservists...” French Foreign Legionnaires were also employed but proved unsuited to understanding the nature of counter-insurgency operations and the need to “win the hearts and minds.” They were often brutal, resentful of the civilians and turned the civilians into FLN supporters. They were capable of great mobility but preferred to operate outposts without maximizing positive contact with the people.

The greatest French failure was in not coordinating their civil-police-military operation in a manner similar to the British Briggs Plan in Malaya. They did not focus on the cause of nationalism and French/European social and economic dominance. Nor did they appreciate the Muslim masses as the struggle’s center of gravity. Although their program of *la guerre revolutionnaires* called for “destruction and construction”, (first destruction of the ALN and their political base and then construction of the society as a whole) the French could not coordinate their efforts effectively. Their *quadrillage* program of blanketing key population areas and isolating the insurgents by exclusion also proved effective but it did not contribute to solving the “cause” of the insurgency and did not thoroughly address the center of gravity.

The French did many things well militarily. They killed many ALN and have even been credited with “winning” militarily. They built-up their forces quickly and to a good level. Their concept of *la guerre revolutionnaires* was sound and their *quadrillage* system was promising. But they ultimately lost because they could not connect the operational and strategic goals to their tactical means.

TENETS OF INSURGENCY AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Insurgencies have been fought for a variety of reasons. Ideologically they may be motivated by a variety of factors; communism, nationalism, ethnicity, crime and religion. But the

root cause of an insurgency is never just ideological. There is always an issue or issues that give the insurgents a cause around which to build support. Identification of this cause is essential if the counter-insurgency is to be successful. Addressing the cause as the strategic center of gravity should focus the whole effort of the counter-insurgency. While the same center of gravity may not exist at each level of war, the link between the different levels to ultimately impact the strategic center of gravity is critical. So too is it critical that the different means of counter-insurgency work in harmony with strategic goals. Historically, the British were far more effective at this than the French.

Like any other crisis, an insurgency has a beginning, middle and end. The strategies vary in each part and can even be repeated, but commonly at its beginning, an insurgency is weak. This initial position of weakness is an opportunity host nations typically do not capitalize on. Especially in democratic societies, the slowness to react allows insurgencies to grow and may even provide instances for the insurgents to propagandize. The start of an insurgency involves building a “party” or organization, establishing leadership and beginning the education of potential followers. As the organization grows, its acts of insurgency go beyond words and involve terrorist and guerrilla actions. Initially these tactics are used because the organization is new, resource constrained and trying to grow. As it progresses the insurgency will not cease these types of operations, only their frequency, intensity and movement of forces will change. The insurgent’s final stage will be a shift to conventional warfare. In this stage, after growing in support and resources, the insurgency hopes to have weakened the host nation enough to defeat him in combat. While these stages are normally successive, in some cases a stage can be

skipped or even repeated if the counter-insurgency has some success. These stages are organized into five specific functions as follows:

1. Creation of a Party
2. Building a United Front
3. Guerrilla Warfare
4. Movement Warfare
5. Annihilation Warfare

Counter-insurgencies also have stages. Julian Paget defines these stages as:

1. Prelude to Military Operation
2. Initiation of Military Operations
3. Large scale military Operations

Annex III shows these stages of insurgency and counter-insurgency operations together on a single chart. Typically the stages of counter-insurgency lag behind those of the insurgency. This delay in response surrenders the initiative to the insurgent and if not corrected can be a cause of failure for the host nation. History shows that an earlier shift between stages by the host nation is key to defeating the insurgent.

Early application of military force is a critical aspect of successful counter-insurgency operations; so too is the combined application of means available to the host nation. Essential military force used by the counter-insurgent is a means towards defeating the insurgent's guerrillas and/or conventional forces. While defeat of these forces may be recognized as the tactical center of gravity it is but one part of the overall operation. To be successful, the cause of the insurgency must be addressed, problems must be solved and the host nation's people must be protected. Whether it comes from within or outside the host nation, the following means must be used in combating an insurgency:

- Political, Economic, Humanitarian
- Police/Judicial
- Military {both SOF & Conventional}

Annex IV depicts the application of these means across the three stages of a counter-insurgency identified earlier. In successful counter-insurgencies all means are always in use. Failing to do this will provide the insurgent the ability to shift his focus of effort. The degree or percentage of total effort at any point may fluctuate between means in response to the insurgency's actions but, it must remain a total effort. Note too that while the degree of SOF participation may vary slightly it does not change very much. It cannot expand much because their very nature and modus operandi is to operate as a small force. The area of greatest change is the use of conventional forces and police. During many counter-insurgency operations the dividing line between police and military missions blur. In response to a growing military threat from the insurgents, the host nation must greatly increase his conventional force application.

Strictly speaking, the choice of whose forces are used (host nation or U.S.) to fight an insurgent is insignificant. However, as a highly political extension of statecraft the host nation must be careful any invited support does not undermine the strategic objective. The matter of host nation relevance and legitimacy is of critical importance. FM 100-20, "Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict", makes this point very well when it states that U.S. involvement must be limited in order not to threaten host nation legitimacy and therefore actually work against the ultimate goals.

The insurgent has two great strengths that require attention by the host nation: the ability to seize and maintain the initiative, and the uses of time and space to compensate for a shortcoming in forces. By their nature, insurgencies are protracted and asymmetric in force

application. The insurgent picks and chooses when, where and how he will strike. By doing so he has the initiative and can force the counter-insurgent to strike back wantonly, with little effect. The insurgent will remain dispersed to keep from becoming a lucrative target for the counter-insurgent's forces. He will then mass his forces to strike the counter-insurgent who has been forced to disperse, and therefore weaken his military, in order to cover more territory. Unless the initiative is taken away from him and the operational factors are made to benefit the counter-insurgent, the insurgent will likely succeed.

While the insurgent tries to capitalize on his own strengths, so too must the counter-insurgent. Although tainted by whatever the cause of the insurgency may be (it will have some appeal to some sector of society) the host nation does have the legitimacy and rights of a sovereign nation. Its judiciary, police and social infra-structure are already established. Having such a structure is exactly what the insurgent is trying to build while establishing his party and expanding his influence. This infra-structure is a strength because it can facilitate taking legal action against the insurgency; its party, supporters and military faction. This same infra-structure should be used to address the causes of the insurgency, i.e., land reform, social equality, etc. Finally, being a legitimate nation means having rapid access to international agencies like the United Nations and the World Bank who can help "fix" the problem, combat the insurgents or both.

Militarily, the counter-insurgent must be careful not to win the battle and lose the war. While the role of the military, both SOF and conventional, is critical, it cannot "win" the counter-insurgency. To do that all the means of power must be employed. The military can lose the counter-insurgency if it is not employed in a manner consistent with the attainment of the

strategic objective. The previously examined historical examples were both successful military actions at the tactical level. The French however, poisoned the people with their brutal treatment and to that extent they fed the insurgent's propaganda machine and turned neutral and pro-French populations towards the National Liberation Front (FLN).

Examination of the British success in Malaya and the French failure in Algeria facilitates drawing several conclusions and lessons learned which can then be applied to the critical evaluation of doctrine. Ultimately, proposals to change counter-insurgency doctrine will be made.

CONCLUSIONS FROM HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

From the analysis of history, four principles not emphasized in doctrine, yet clearly essential to successful prosecution of a counter-insurgency are offered: 1. Deploy Conventional Light Infantry Forces Early. Counter-insurgency is not the sole realm of SOF and although they are an essential ingredient in pursuing this type of warfare, if the insurgency is able to operate in stage III, SOF alone will not be enough. While JP 3-07.1 is right to warn about "Americanization" of another country's war, hesitation in the requisite application of force yields the initiative to the insurgent. 2. The Application of Conventional Force Must Be Robust. History shows that although conventional forces are key, they must overwhelm to achieve results. Counter-insurgency operations can be strengthened by precision firepower, timely command and control (C2), intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR), and modern mobility, but it remains an infantrymen's war. Patrolling, area domination and population control are accomplished by men with rifles and bayonets. 3. Operate All Forces Simultaneously Across The Spectrum Of Targets. FID doctrine addresses the many aspects of an insurgency

and assigns it as a primary mission to SOF. Even when conventional force is applied, SOF and other means must continue their efforts. As Annex IV shows, consistent pressure must be applied in the realms of politics, economics, humanitarian, social services, police, judicial and military. Counter-insurgency operations are complex and require attention on many fronts. To do otherwise will create force application gaps the insurgent will surely exploit. 4. All Means Available Must Focus On And Progress Toward A Common Policy Objective. By “Means” I refer to the Humanitarian/Political/Economic, Police/Judicial, SOF and Conventional Light Forces mentioned earlier and depicted in Annex IV. A counter-insurgency that does not employ all its means simultaneously is in great danger. Consistent with the Briggs plan, a successful counter-insurgency may have varied forces at hand that may even have their own tactical objective (destroying guerrillas or building society) but pursuit of these objectives cannot run counter to the overall strategy. This addresses the biggest flaw in our present doctrine. Use of the military in general and conventional forces in particular is so de-emphasized that when eventually employed, the operational commander must not frame his mission to exclude non-military means. The military commander will impact every facet of counter-insurgency operations regardless of the level of his involvement or whether his is the main or supporting effort.

The most natural mission for conventional military forces is destruction of the insurgent’s guerrillas. As we have seen, much more is likely to be required. This will blur distinction between the tactical missions assigned and the operational or strategic objectives to be attained. Applied at the operational level, these four principles will help bridge the doctrinal gap we have today.

ALIGNMENT OF DOCTRINE TO HISTORICAL LESSONS LEARNED

U.S. doctrine in counter-insurgency warfare lacks specificity, fails to emphasize the necessary military force application and leaves the operational commander and his staff without sufficient guidance to prosecute their efforts. The first problem is the overemphasis of counter-insurgency as a FID mission, and the assignment of FID as a primary mission of SOF. While SOF clearly are essential to FID they are unable to fight and win if the insurgency advances to stage III. Their success in stages I and II can be dramatic, but if national interests dictate the application of force in addition to SOF and host nation capability the operational commander must be prepared and have a force ready for coordinated action.

Both joint publications and historical analysis identify the dangers of non-indigenous forces fighting a counter-insurgency. The point is made that U.S. forces should limit their actions to logistics support and training for host nation forces, and defense. Failure to emphasize the total integration of U.S. forces into a counter-insurgency ignores the fact that they are already likely involved in a deteriorating situation, that the host nation's government to some extent has lost the initiative and that U.S. forces are a viable option. It also fails to take advantage of the capabilities of American servicemen. Army and Marine personnel are exceptionally disciplined, intelligent, motivated and tough. They are the perfect counter-insurgency fighters. They can exceed the high attributes demonstrated by the British in Malaya yet share few of the French weakness showcased in Algeria.

The British and French experiences demonstrate that some adjustment in tactics and techniques will be required whenever forces are deployed. Deploying conventional force early is as important as those forces arriving ready to take decisive action. Democracies react slowly

but sound doctrine can help ensure capable forces are employed. Regardless of how fast forces are deployed, if they are not prepared it could make the situation worse than not having them there at all.

The gap between strategy and tactics is dangerously wide. At the operational level of war, counter-insurgency operations are not an assigned mission, only unconventional warfare is “assigned”. The focus on “pure” military aspects of counter-insurgency operations at the tactical level could lead to a disconnect between all the assets applied to win the counter-insurgency war. If only as a matter of emphasis operational commanders must expect to apply force across the spectrum of conflict and understand how tactical actions will have operational and strategic implications.

PROPOSALS TO ALTER DOCTRINE

A properly focused doctrine reflects an understanding of the lessons from history and outlines a formula for future success. In the case of counter-insurgency operations, as demonstrated in the previous section, the U.S. has a significant doctrine-future operations disconnect. To avoid pending failure corrections are needed in doctrine, training and exercise routine.

The UJTL categorizes FID at the theater strategic level to “coordinate theater foreign internal defense activities.” What is needed is a tasking for someone to conduct these operations. At the operational level, under the task of Operational Maneuver and Movement should be, “conduct foreign internal defense”. Adding this task provides focus to the operational commander and his staff while providing a means of identifying who will conduct the many and diverse aspects of FID. Presently, the task of “conduct unconventional warfare”

without mentioning FID as a whole drives the force assignment exclusively to SOF. The focus on SOF for FID in general and counter-insurgency operations in particular can leave our conventional light forces unprepared and misused.

Joint Publication 3-07.1 (FID) needs a change in emphasis. Presently there is great stress placed on supporting FID through non-combat means. It states that if combat forces are required, they will be used for protection and stabilizing the situation. The JP should emphasize the use of conventional force as likely, and above stage II in the insurgency, key to successful operations. The JP does not have to be a proponent of the use of U.S. forces. It should emphasize foremost that conventional forces in overwhelming number are necessary. It should also identify counter-insurgency operations as a conventional forces' mission that operational commanders must be prepared to fully integrate into a FID strategy.

It is not enough to have a joint publication on FID that mentions counter-insurgency operations. There should be a joint publication specifically addressing counter-insurgencies. Actions and responsibilities at the theater strategic, operational and tactical levels need to be addressed from the military, police and judicial, humanitarian, political and economic perspectives. This publication needs to capture the essence of insurgent warfare and how to fight and win against it. Such a publication will provide the impetus for service doctrine development.

America enjoys the freedom to decide; take action, or not take action. If we choose not to change our outlook on counter-insurgency warfare and fix our doctrine we will pay a price. Our present doctrine has us heading for trouble in several areas. The pitfalls of not fixing

the disconnect between Doctrine and the conduct of counter-insurgency operations have already been mentioned and are provided in Annex II as a recap.

CONCLUSION

U.S. joint and service doctrine does not sufficiently addresses counter-insurgency operations. Counter-insurgency warfare has been and will remain a sign of the times. To be successful in the future, the United States must prepare now with doctrine that guides the operational commander and staff to success. Conventional light forces must be ready for large scale employment and complete integration of counter-insurgency tasks. Failure to recognize the likely future and adjust doctrine to ready forces, could cause the late application of the wrong force executing a different mission that is not synchronized with all the means of national power being applied.

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Annex I

Definitions and Abbreviations

Definitions

Civil Affairs. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and non-governmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. (JP 1-02)

Civil-military Operations. Group of planned activities in support of military operations that enhance the relationship between the military forces and civilian authorities and population and which promote the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

Conventional Forces. Those forces capable of conducting operations using non-nuclear weapons. (JP 1-02)

Counter-insurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. (JP 1-02)

Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Political, economic, informational and military support provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion and insurgency. (JP 1-02)

Guerrilla Force. A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy held, hostile or denied territory. (JP 1-02)

Guerrilla Warfare. Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. (JP 1-02)

Insurgency. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02)

Insurgency could be considered an extra-constitutional, compositively progressive and variegated struggle launched against the incumbent authority by the consciously mobilized sections of indigenous masses for the fulfillment of certain conceptual goals manifesting emancipation. Insurgency and Counter-insurgency, LtCol. V.K. Anand, Deep & Deep Publications, New Delhi, India, 1981. Page 28.

Insurgency, then, is a hybrid form of conflict that combines subversion, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism. It is an internal, struggle in which a disaffected group seeks to gain control of a nation. British Counterinsurgency, 1910-1960, Thomas R. Mockaitis, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1990. Page 3.

Low Intensity Conflict. ... below conventional war and above the routine, ... ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. ... waged by a combination of means ... contain certain regional and global security implications... (JP 1-02)

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Operations that encompass the USCC of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during and after war.

Nation Assistance. Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crisis or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other U.S. Code Title 10 (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations. (JP 1-02)

Special Operations. Operations conducted by special organized, trained, and equipped, military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called S.O. (JP 1-02)

Special Operations Forces. Those active and reserve component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized trained and equipped to conduct and support special operations. (JP 1-02)

Unconventional Warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare, and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. Also called U.W. (JP 1-02)

Abbreviations

<u>ALN</u>	National Liberation Army
<u>CI</u>	Counter-insurgency
<u>FID</u>	Foreign Internal Defense
<u>FLN</u>	National Liberation Front
<u>IDAD</u>	International Defense and Development
<u>JP</u>	Joint Publication
<u>LIC</u>	Low Intensity Conflict
<u>METL</u>	Mission Essential Task List
<u>MCP</u>	Malaya Communist Party
<u>MOOTW</u>	Military Operations Other Than War
<u>MPAJA</u>	Malaya People's Anti-Japanese Army
<u>MRLA</u>	Malaya Races Liberation Army
<u>SO</u>	Special Operations
<u>SOF</u>	Special Operations Forces
<u>UJTL</u>	Universal Joint Task List
<u>UW</u>	Unconventional Warfare

Annex II

Pitfalls

Focused doctrine, properly applied helps ensure future success. A misaligned doctrine can leave success in question and raise the price paid in material resources and lives. Present doctrine has us heading for the following:

1. Overtasked SOF units. These units are critical in addressing each stage of an insurgency but they are not manned, equipped or trained for conventional warfare at the scale necessary in stages III, IV and V.

2. Conventional forces winning battles but losing operationally and strategically. Conventional forces must be able to fight counter-insurgency warfare not just counter-guerrilla battles. Presently, service tactics, techniques and procedures do not add up to operational success.

3. Military forces operating tangentially or at cross purpose to other instruments of power. Without the broader focus on counter-insurgency operations conducted by conventional light forces the military will not successfully integrate its efforts with other means of national power. Current doctrine does not guide the coordinated effort of military, civil and judicial action.


4. Employing conventional forces too late. Doctrine fails to emphasize the need for the early application of overwhelming conventional force. Forces that arrive late surrender the initiative and will likely face a stronger insurgency, causing greater friendly casualties and put mission accomplishment in question.

5. Losing sight of the strategic center of gravity at the operational and tactical level.

Because conventional forces are not focused on counter-insurgency warfare but only counter-guerrilla operation (at best) their focus on destruction of the enemy can lead to the use of excessive force that could cause the loss of support from the host nation's people. As the French experienced in Algeria and America learned in Vietnam, winning battles does not always equate to winning wars.

Annex III

Steps of an Insurgency and Stages of a Counter-insurgency




This slide aligns the historical stages of an insurgency and contrasts them with the stages of a counter-insurgency (CI). Note CI ops typically lag insurgency ops. Initially, insurgents have the initiative and that initiative does not shift until the infusion of CI military force. This assumes the insurgency has been able to progress. The more successful insurgent adapts to the CI's build-up of strength by reverting to earlier stages of his insurgency. Successful CIs integrate mil-civil-police assets to maintain full spectrum pressure against insurgents.

23. Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice, David Galula Schoomaker, Fredric A. Praegen Press, N.Y., N.Y., 1964, Page 44 - 58.

24. Counter-insurgency Operations, Julian Paget, Walker and Company, New York, 1967. Page 30.

Annex IV

Means to Combat an Insurgency



This slide depicts a successful CI operation. It integrates civil-military-police ops throughout the stages of a counter-insurgency. Note the differences from the previous slide (Annex IV) in that in this case, the CI seizes the initiative early and is less reactive to the insurgent. Note too the early infusion of conventional forces and the consistent application of SOF.